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FIFTH AMENDMENT-TWICE JEOPARDIZING
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: THE
SUPREME COURT'S TIBBS AND
KENNEDY DECISIONS
Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982);
Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct 2083 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment' continues to
be the subject of much litigation. The Supreme Court decided two cases
involving double jeopardy claims last term-Tibbs v. Florida,2 involving a conviction reversed on appeal, and Oregon v. Kennedy, 3 involving a
mistrial. Although the cases arose out of very different factual and procedural contexts, they both represent the Court's attempt to limit the
protection that the double jeopardy clause offers to defendants in criminal proceedings.
II.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE CONTEXT OF APPELLATE REVERSAL:

TIBBS v

FLORIDA

The Supreme Court held in Tibbs v. Florida that an appellate reversal based on the weight of the evidence, unlike that based on the sufficiency of the evidence, does not bar retrial. 4 In so holding, the Court
drew a sharp legal distinction between weight and sufficiency of evidence,5 and refused to expand the double jeopardy defense. By thus
confining double jeopardy protection, criminal defendants will continue
to face retrial after their convictions have been reversed on grounds of
evidentiary weight.
A.

BACKGROUND OF TIBBS

Delbert Lee Tibbs was indicted in 1974 for first degree murder,
felony murder and rape. A man in a green truck had picked up two

I The double jeopardy clause provides:

"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."

2 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).
3 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982).
4 102 S. Ct. at 2213.

5 Id. at 2218.
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hitchhikers, male and female, near Ft. Myers, Florida, and then drove
into a field, shot the man, and raped the woman. The rape victim escaped and gave police a description of the assailant. Based on this
description, 6 Tibbs was arrested and charged with the crimes. The rape
victim was the chief prosecution witness and only eyewitness to the
crimes. 7 The jury convicted Tibbs of first degree murder and rape, and
recommended the death penalty.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
a new trial, holding that the trial record left the court with considerable
doubt about the guilt of the accused;8 the court identified six weaknesses
in the State's case. 9 On remand, the trial court dismissed the indictment, basing its decision on the United States Supreme Court decisions
in Burks v. UnitedStates t0 and Qreene v. Massy I barring retrial after rever6 The Supreme Court noted that the rape victim's initial identification of the accused
was somewhat irregular, because rather than being asked to pick his picture out of a group of
photographs, she was shown only pictures of Tibbs taken when he was first questioned. Because the identification process was not included in his basis for appeal, it was not considered
in the Court's opinion. Id. at 2213-14 n.2.
7 Under Florida law, no corroborative evidence is required in a rape case where the victim is able to testify directly and identify her assailant. However, where the victim is the sole
witness, her testimony must be carefully scrutinized "to avoid an unmerited conviction."
Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976) (quoting Thomas v. State, 167 So. 2d 309, 310
(Fla. 1964)). Other witnesses in Tibbs included law enforcement agents, a man who had previously picked up the hitchhikers, the homeowner who called the police for the rape victim,
acquaintances of the murder victim, the doctor who examined the rape victim, the doctor
who performed the autopsy and a convicted rapist who was Tibbs' cellmate while Tibbs was
awaiting trial. 102 S. Ct. at 2214 n.3.
8 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d at 790 (Fla. 1976). Under Florida law, the Florida Supreme
Court must review convictions where the death penalty has been imposed, to determine
whether the interests ofjustice require a new trial. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1975), FLA. ApP.
RULE 6.16(b) (1962) (Rule 9.140() (1977)).
9 No evidence was introduced to place Tibbs in the Fort Myers area at any time, and the
defense produced evidence that he had been in another part of the state the day before and
three days after the crimes. Prosecutors introduced a signature card from a Salvation Army
shelter in Orlando, the closest the State could place Tibbs to Fort Myers. The green truck, car
keys and murder weapon were never found. Tibbs was stopped and questioned three times
before being arrested and cooperated fully each time. He voluntarily waived extradition
from Mississippi where he was finally arrested. No evidence was introduced to cast doubt on
Tibbs' veracity, he had no previous criminal record, and several people from his hometown
testified that he was a law-abiding citizen.
In contrast, the rape victim's testimony was cast in doubt by her claim that the crimes
took place during the day when all other evidence indicated that they occurred after dark.
She admitted using marijuana immediately prior to the crimes. The manner in which she
identified Tibbs from photographs suggested a less than reliable identification. In addition,
the Florida Supreme Court wholly discounted the testimony of Tibbs' cellmate, who testified
that Tibbs had confessed to the crime, because the testimony appeared to the court to be the
product of purely selfish considerations, i.e., leniency in exchange for his testimony. Tibbs v.
State, 337 So. 2d at 790-91.
10 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
11 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
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sal for insufficient evidence. 12 The Florida District Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded because it disagreed with the trial court's application of Burks and Greene to Tibbs, finding that Tibbs was reversed on
the weight of the evidence while Burks and Greene applied only to rever14
sals for insufficient evidence. 13 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed,
explicitly holding that its previous reversal of Tibbs' conviction was
based on the weight, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. 15 Finally, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Supreme
Court's decision.
B.

ESTABLISHING A CLEAR PRECEDENT

In reaching its decision in Tibbs, the Supreme Court followed the
Florida Supreme Court's carefully elaborated distinction between a reversal stemming from insufficient evidence and one prompted by the
weight of the evidence. 16 Writing for the majority, 17 Justice O'Connor
refused to equate reversals based on the weight of the evidence with
reversals based on insufficient evidence.' The Court had held previously, in Burks v. United States 19 and Greene v. Massey ,20 that a reversal for
12 Burks and Greene were companion cases. Greene applied the Burks decision to the states.
13 Tibbs v. State, 370 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979),af dperauriam, 397 So. 2d
1120 (Fla. 1981), aftd, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).
14 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981)(per curiam), afd, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).
15 The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Burks and Greene to bar retrial after conviction
only where the reversal was based on evidentiary insufficiency. Id. at 1127.
16 Justice O'Connor noted that:
As the [Florida Supreme] court explained, a conviction rests upon insufficient evidence
when, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reversal based on the weight of the evidence, on the other hand, draws the appellate
court into questions of credibility. The "weight of the evidence" refers to a "determination [by] the trier of fact that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of
an issue or cause than the other."
102 S. Ct. 2211, 2216 (1982), (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981)(per
curiam)).
t7 ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in the majority
opinion. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined.
18 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
19 437 U.S. 1 (1977). Burks reversed a line of cases dating from 1950 which held that
retrial after the reversal of a conviction for any reason was not barred by double jeopardy
principles if the defendant had requested a new trial in his appeal. The Court apparently
applied a waiver theory in these cases, reasoning that since the defendant appealed, thus
calling his conviction into question, he waived his right to double jeopardy protection. Other
theories advanced to justify retrial included the "clean slate" theory and the "continuing
jeopardy" theory. The clean slate theory held that "the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 720-21 (1969). The continuing jeopardy theory held that retrial of a defendant
whose conviction was reversed is a continuation of the original jeopardy. Jeopardy attaches
when the first trial begins, and does not end until a final judgment is entered. A conviction
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insufficient evidence has the same effect as a verdict of not guilty: retrial
is barred because this type of reversal means that no rational factfinder
could reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
21
doubt.
Justice O'Connor set forth what she deemed to be two policy reasons for the narrow exception recognized in Burks and Greene.22 First,
the double jeopardy clause attaches special weight to judgments of acquittal; 23 a verdict of not guilty absolutely bars a defendant from retrial. 24 Justice O'Connor noted that a reversal based on insufficient
evidence has the same effect as a verdict of acquittal because a reversal
on insufficiency grounds means that no rational factfinder could have
convicted the defendant. 25 Second, the double jeopardy clause prohibits
a second trial for the purposes of affording the prosecution an opportunity to hone its strategies, perfect its evidence, or introduce new evidence
which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. 26 Where a reversal rests
upon insufficiency grounds, the double jeopardy clause bars giving the
27
prosecution a second opportunity to persuade the factfinder.
These policies do not have the same force when a judge disagrees
with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, according to Justice
O'Connor, because in the situation of a reversal based on evidentiary
which the defendant appeals is not considered to be a final judgment. The Supreme Court
never completely adopted either theory. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-29 (1970);
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-97 (1957); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100,
134-37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally, Comment, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial
After Appellate Reversalfor Insufjiient Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 365 (1964).
20 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
21 Burks divided reversals into two categories--reversal for trial error and reversal for insufficient evidence, and held that because a reversal for insufficient evidence is equivalent to
acquittal, retrial is absolutely prohibited. ChiefJustice Burger made the distinction based on
what each type of reversal implies about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. A reversal
for error means only that the accused has been convicted through a defective judicial process
and guilt has not yet been firmly established. The accused has as much interest as does the
State in a fair and error-free retrial to determine guilt or innocence. In contrast, where a
conviction has been overturned for insufficient evidence, the State has had one full and fair
chance to bring its proof forward, but that proof is insufficient as a matter of law. This type
of appellate reversal means that the State's case was so lacking that it should not even have
been submitted to the jury; rather, it should have ended with a directed verdict of acquittal.
Burks, 437 U.S. at 15-16. For a discussion of Burks and prior holdings, see Comment, Constitututional La--Fif/h Amendment-Doublejeopardy ImplicationsofAppellate Reversalfor Inufient Eidence-Burks v. UnitedStates, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 119 (1979).
22 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
23 Id.

24 The general rule that after acquittal retrial is absolutely barred by the double jeopardy
clause was first enunciated in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1892).
25 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
26 Id.

27 Justice O'Connor noted that this prohibition lies at the core of double jeopardy protection. Id.
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weight, acquittal is not the only proper verdict. 28 She characterized the

judge's role as that of a "thirteenth juror" 29 who disagrees with the
jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. 30 She then equated this kind of
reversal with the case of a deadlocked jury which does not result in an
acquittal barring retrial. 3 t In cases where evidence is legally sufficient to
sustain a conviction, acquittal is not the only proper verdict; it is a possible or probable verdict based on the weight of the evidence. The "thirteenth juror" may be a lone holdout, or may be the juror whose beliefs
convince the other previously deadlocked jurors to acquit.
Justice O'Connor justified her resolution of the double jeopardy
claim arising out of a reversal based on the weight of the evidence by the
policy of affording special weight to judgments of acquittal. By asserting that there is a clear distinction between an acquittal (or its
equivalent-a reversal based on insufficient evidence) and a reversal
based on the weight of the evidence, 32 Justice O'Connor was able to
remove the central justification for providing double jeopardy protection to a defendant whose conviction was reversed on the weight of the
evidence. In so doing, she could logically invoke the countervailing considerations which support the rule that a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction generally remains subject to retrial-considerations
such as the high price that society would pay if every accused who succeeded in having his conviction overturned because of error were im33
mune to retrial.
The majority treated reversals based on evidentiary weight in the
same way that reversals for error are treated. 34 This approach is justifi28 Id.
29 Other courts have also characterized the role of the reviewing court as that of a thir-

teenth juror. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1979); aft'd,
633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Felice, 481 F.
Supp. 79, 90 (N.D. Ohio 1978), af'd, 609 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1979). But see United States v.
Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967) (when evidence is
sufficient to warrant submission to the jury, the reviewing court must take care not to sit as a
super jury reevaluating credibility or reweighing evidence).
30 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
31 102 S. Ct. at 2218 n.17. The rule that a defendant may be retried after a deadlocked
jury is discharged dates from the Court's decision in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579 (1824).
32 See Haddad and Mulock, DoubleJeopardyProblemsin the Definition ofthe Same Offense: State
Discretionto Invoke the CriminalProcess Twice, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 515, 544 n.124 (1970), which
discusses degrees of sufficiency.
33 102 S. Ct. at 2217. As Justice Harlan wrote in the United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
466 (1964): "It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted
immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in
the proceedings leading to conviction."
34 The Court held in United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. at 463, that the retrial of a defendant whose conviction is set aside on collateral attack for error in the proceedings leading to
conviction is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. The double jeopardy clause "imposes
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able, however, only if the difference between a judgment of acquittal, or
a reversal based on insufficient evidence, and a reversal based on the
weight of the evidence is not merely a wooden distinction.
A reversal for insufficient evidence means that no rational
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, 35 while a reversal based on the weight of the evidence means that
the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, but the prosecution failed to convince the reviewing court of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrasting the two, the Court was able
to establish the similarity between an insufficient evidence reversal and
acquittal, while asserting the dissimilarity between a weight of the evidence reversal and acquittal. Before double jeopardy protection is triggered, the prosecution's failure must be clear. 36 Because the insufficient
evidence standard "means that the government's case was so lacking
that it should not have even been submitted to the jury,"37 the failure is
clear in an insufficient evidence reversal, but not in a weight of the evidence reversal.
The dissimiliarty between a reversal based on the weight of the evidence and a reversal based on insufficient evidence, however, is not necessarily as clear as Justice O'Connor believed. In either case, the
reviewing court is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty.38 Only in the second case does the Court afford the
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding. Dissenting, Justice White pointed out
that the majority failed to explain why the prosecution should be allowed another try when, in both cases, the state failed to present evidence adequate to sustain the conviction. 3 9 Apparently, Justice White
felt that the Court's distinction between a reversal for insufficient evidence and a reversal based on the weight of the evidence was a distinction without a difference. 40
no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his
first conviction set aside." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1980) (trial error).
35 102 S. Ct. at 2218.
36 Id. (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 17).
37 102 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 16).
38 Justice White, in his dissent, concluded that "[i]n each instance, a reviewing court decides that, as a matter of law, the decision of the factfinder cannot stand . . . . [t]he fact
remains that the state failed to prove the defendant guilty in accordance with the evidentiary
requirements of the law." 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
39 Id.
40 Justice White also pointed out that although the majority conceded that the double

jeopardy clause would bar reprosecution if the State's evidence failed to meet the federal due
process standard of evidentiary insufficiency, the majority failed to explain why the state
should be allowed another try where its proof has been held inadequate on state law grounds,
when it could not do so were its proof inadequate on federal law grounds. Justice White felt
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A reversal based on the weight of the evidence is also not necessarily incompatible with the standard of acquittal. In many trials resulting
in acquittal, the evidence may be legally sufficient to convict, 4 ' but the
jury may not have believed that the defendant was guilty. Our legal
system does not permit inquiry into the reasons for acquittal, nor can
acquitted defendants be retried for the same offense 42 no matter what
the reason may have been for the acquittal. 4 3 Thus, although the weighing of evidence traditionally has been the unique function of the
factfinder, 44 different treatment of a case when the decision is made by a
45
reviewing court rather than by a jury seems arbitrary and unfair.
The majority ignored any similarities and instead concluded that a
reversal of a conviction based on the weight of the evidence "simply
affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment. '46 This, of course, would also be true if retrial were allowed in a
case where a conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence. Although
the Court conceded in a footnote 4 7 that a second chance for the defendant inevitably affords the prosecution a second chance as well, Justice
O'Connor dismissed this concern by rationalizing that the passage of
time may not necessarily strengthen the prosecution's case but may
weaken it.48 The passage of time may also weaken the defendant's
that the Court made an artificial distinction and treated similar cases very differently. 102 S.
Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting).
41 For evidence to be legally sufficient to convict, the prosecution must present at least
some evidence on each element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979).
42 In some cases, defendants can be retried on different charges arising out of the same
incident. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957).
43 See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1977) (defendant could not be retried after
erroneous rulings of law led to acquittal).
44 As the Court stated in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942), "[i]t is not for us
to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses." See United States v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1980) (questions as to the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony are for the jury and not for a reviewing court); United
States v. Waldron, 568 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1977) (it is not the task of the reviewing court
to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1977); Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1977) (the reviewing court does
not weigh the evidence, and the finding of the trial court must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support it), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1977).
45 The same general rules and standards apply in cases where a defendant has been acquitted by a judge in a bench trial rather than by a jury. The major difference is that the
reviewing court would be more likely to be aware of the reasons for acquittal. 102 S.Ct. at
2218. See also United States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (government could
not appeal acquittal entered after deadlocked jury was discharged; trial judge indicated evidence clearly insufficient to convict); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (government could not appeal defendant's acquittal in bench trial).
46 102 S. Ct. at 2219.
47 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.19.
48 ld.
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case,49 however, a consideration which Justice O'Connor ignored. Furthermore, disproportionate government resources present an obvious
danger that prosecutors will have an additional advantage when given a
second chance at prosecution. 50
Justice White criticized the majority's statement that the reversal
simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable
judgment, and called it a "mischaracterization of the appellate court's
ruling." 5' He emphasized that the prosecution, not the defense, has the
burden of coming forth with a new case on retrial. 52 The defendant has
already demonstrated that the prosecutor's case, as it was presented at
trial, was inadequate to sustain a conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether the evidence was legally insufficient as a matter of
law, or failed to convince the factfinder or reviewing court, should make
no difference. 53 Justice White believed that, if the State has not sustained its burden of proof as to the defendant's guilt, then the double
jeopardy clause should bar retrial. The thrust of Justice White's dissent
was that the majority attempted to avoid one of the central policies of
49 For example, Justice O'Connor mentioned in footnote 19 that the memory of a prosecution witness could become impaired with the passage of time and affect the credibility of
the witness' testimony. She failed to note that a faded memory also affects the credibility of
defense witnesses. Id.
50 As the Court noted in Green v. United States, 355 U.S 184, 187-88 (1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarassment expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.
51 102 S.Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting). While Justice O'Connor saw a reversal based
on the weight of the evidence as giving the defendant another chance which he would not
otherwise have, Justice White viewed retrial under these circumstances as affording the prosecution another chance at conviction when it failed the first time-an opportunity to which
the State is not constitutionally entitled. Id.
52 Justice White assumed that if the State were to present the same evidence again, a state
court would have to reverse any conviction based upon it. 102 S.Ct. at 2221. See also Tibbs
v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1130 (Sundberg, CJ., dissenting), afd, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982). The
State cannot logically be allowed to supplement its evidence at retrial without completely
ignoring the kinds of problems the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect against.
Justice O'Connor answered this criticism by emphasizing the "interests ofjustice," commenting that the reviewing court would have to confront an especially strong case in order to
reverse a conviction based on evidentiary weight a second time. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.18.
53 Justice White proposed a different distinction for use in determining when a reversal
should bar retrial. He would make the relevant distinction between reversals based on evidentiary grounds and those based on procedural grounds. In contrast to the Florida court's
characterization of Tibbs as a distinct third category, Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1123,
Justice White would include it in the evidentiary category. Only where reversal was based on
procedural error would the State be allowed to retry the defendant. Once the State failed to
make its proof, the double jeopardy clause would be an absolute bar to another trial on the
same charges. 102 S.Ct. at 2223.
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the double jeopardy clause-preventing the government from perfecting
its case through successive attempts at prosecution.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court was sharply divided in
Tibbs because of differing views on how to apply the policies underlying
the double jeopardy clause, the Court established a clear precedent with
its decision. Not so clear, however, is whether the holding in Tibbs will
prove workable.
C.

TIBBS AS A WORKABLE RULE

Courts must be able to distinguish between and apply the standards of insufficient evidence and evidentiary weight without confusion
under the Tibbs rule. The Supreme Court of Florida in Tibbs discussed
the difficulties in distinguishing between the weight and sufficiency of
evidence,54 and ruled that the decisions cited by the Florida District
Court in its dismissal of Tibbs' indictment, cases which previously had

been thought to involve reversals based on evidentiary weight, in fact
involved evidentiary insufficiency instead.5

5

As a practical matter, the

distinction between weight and sufficiency of evidence is not entirely

clear or easily made. 56 Yet, the Supreme Court dismissed Tibbs' argument that the distinction is unworkable5

7

by noting that trial and appel-

late judges commonly distinguish between the two. 58
More important than the question of whether Tibbs draws a worka-

ble distinction between weight and sufficiency of evidence is the decision's potential for abuse by appellate courts. There is a risk that the
Court's distinction in Tibbs will undermine the Burks rule barring retrial
after a reversal for insufficient evidence by encouraging appellate judges
to base reversals not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on the weight
of the evidence in an effort to ensure that the defendant will be retried.
Justice O'Connor responded to this concern by making a weak ar54 Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d at 1123-25.
55 The Florida Supreme Court, in Tibbs' second appeal, discussed seven cases which were
ambiguous as to the reason for reversal and could be read as based either on the insufficiency
of the evidence or the weight of the evidence. The court held that these cases all involved
insufficient evidence. In only one case was the reversal held to be on grounds of evidentiary
weight, and that reversal was overturned. Id. at 1124-25.
56 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "[h]enceforth, no appellate court should reverse a conviction or judgment on the grounds that the weight of the evidence is tenuous or
insubstantial." Id. at 1125. The court chided itself for its improper and erroneous reweighing
of the evidence in its previous disposition of the case. The United States Supreme Court felt
that the Florida Supreme Court's ruling did not diminish the importance of the issue in Tibbs,
because other jurisdictions sometimes rely on the weight of the evidence to overturn convictions. 102 S. Ct. at 2216 n.12.
57 102 S. Ct. at 2219-20.
58 102 S. Ct. at 2220.
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gument thatJackson v. Virginia5 9 restrains the power of appellate courts
to mask reversals based on legally insufficient evidence as reversals
grounded on the weight of the evidence. The Court held inJackson that
the due process clause forbids any conviction to be based on evidence
insufficient to persuade a rational factfinder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, thus setting a lower limit on an appellate court's definition
of evidentiary sufficiency. 60 This lower limit, coupled with the Court's
belief that state appellate judges faithfully will honor their obligations to
enforce applicable state and federal law, 6 1 convinced the majority that
their decision in Tibbs will not undermine Burks by permitting judges to
62
mask their reasons for reversal.
Putting aside intentional abuse, however, the holding in Tibbs will
almost certainly encourage judges to use the weight of the evidence standard in reversing convictions whenever there is the slightest doubt about
the insufficiency of the evidence. Just becauseJackson set a lower standard for evidentiary sufficiency does not mean that appellate courts will
be restrained.
D.

CONCLUSION

Tibbs established a very clear rule strictly limiting the availability
of double jeopardy protection to reversals based on evidentiary insufficiency. The Supreme Court justified its holding by drawing a sharp
distinction between weight and sufficiency of evidence where, in practice, a bright line may not always exist. The decision creates a very real
risk that appellate courts will use the weight of the evidence standard to
overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence in order to ensure
that defendants will be retried. The Court ignored the underlying policies which militate against allowing retrials after reversals based on evidentiary grounds. Prosecutors will now be able to hone their trial
strategies and perfect their evidence as appellate court judges reverse
cases for lack of evidentiary weight.
59 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Jackron involved a federal habeas corpus proceeding brought by a
convicted mi4rderer who claimed that the evidence on the issue of premeditation was insufficient to establish his guilt.
60 Id. at 318.
61 In Oregon v. Kennedy, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2090 (1982), Justice Rehnquist justified the
restriction of double jeopardy protection in the context of mistrials by assuming that, without
a very narrow rule, trial judges would be reluctant to grant mistrials. By comparing Kennedy
with Tibbs, one can conclude that the United States Supreme Court trusts appellate judges to
honor their obligations and conform to the law, but does not trust trial judges to follow the

law.
62 102 S. Ct. at 2220.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN THE CONTEXT OF MISTRIALS CAUSED BY
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

In Oregon v. Kennedy 63 the Supreme Court held that where a defendant in a criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, the defendant
can invoke the double jeopardy bar against retrial only if the conduct
giving rise to the mistrial motion was prosecutorial or judicial misconduct intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. The
decision severely limits the protection of the double jeopardy clause in
this context by placing the burden of establishing prosecutorial intent to
cause a mistrial on the defendant. As a result of the Court's decision,
successful double jeopardy claims in the mistrial context probably will
be very rare.
A.

BACKGROUND OF KENNEDY

The defendant in Kennedy was accused of stealing an Oriental rug.
One of the State's witnesses was an Oriental rug expert whom the prosecutor called to identify and value the rug in question. On cross-examination, the defense attorney attempted to demonstrate bias by
establishing that the witness had previously filed a criminal complaint
against the defendant. On redirect examination, the prosecutor attempted to establish the reason for the witness's filing of the complaint,
but the defense blocked this line of questioning by an objection. 64 The
prosecutor then asked the witness whether he had ever done business
with the defendant. When the witness responded that he had not, the
prosecutor asked, "[i]s that because he is a crook?" 65 The trial court
then granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
On retrial, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on double
jeopardy grounds, but the court rejected the claim, 66 and the defendant
was tried and convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, sustaining the double jeopardy claim because the prosecutor's conduct
amounted to "overreaching" and was "a direct personal attack on the
general character of the defendant. ' 67 The Supreme Court reversed the
Oregon court's decision and remanded the case.
63 102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982).
64 The Court of Appeals later concluded that the trial judge was probably wrong to sustain this objection. State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. 415, 417, 619 P.2d 948, 949 (1980), rev'd,
102 S. Ct. 2083 (1982).
65 102 S. Ct. at 2086.
66 The trial court first held a hearing at which the prosecutor testified. The court found

that the prosecutor had not intended to cause a mistrial. Id.
67 The Oregon Court of Appeals accepted the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did
not intend to cause a mistrial. State v. Kennedy, 49 Or. App. at 418-19, 619 P.2d at 949-50.
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RESTRICTING DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION

Justice Rehnquist, writing for a Court unanimous in its result but
sharply divided in its reasoning and analysis, 8 discussed at some length
the application of the double jeopardy defense to cases involving mistrials. 69 The double jeopardy defense can arise in the mistrial context
70
either where the trial was terminated over the defendant's objection
or where mistrial was declared on the defendant's own motion. As a
general rule, retrial is not barred in either case. 1 The Supreme Court
68 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined the majority
opinion. Justice Powell filed a short concurring opinion in which he emphasized that intent
must be determined by the objective facts and circumstances of the particular case. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment only, and wrote a short
opinion noting his view that nothing in the Court's opinion would prevent the Oregon courts
from concluding that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Oregon Constitution. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, also filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, but disagreeing with the majority on the rule to be
applied.
69 The first issue addressed by the majority was whether the court of appeals' decision
rested on an independent and adequate state ground. The Court concluded that the court
below rested its decision solely on federal law and thus was able to reach the merits of the
case. 102 S. Ct. at 2087.
70 When a mistrial is declared on the motion of the judge or prosecutor or over the defendant's objection, a manifest necessity standard is applied to determine whether the interests of justice were served by the declaration of a mistrial. The standard was first set out in
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580, as an attempt to balance the competing
interests of society in fair trials and of defendants in their right to be judged by their first
tribunals. The Court in Perez stated that judges must have the "authority to discharge a jury
from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise
be defeated." Id. Perez involved a deadlocked jury, which has since been recognized as the
classic case of manifest necessity. The standard has been considerably broadened so that if
the decision to grant a mistrial is found to be "sound," the defendant may be retried. See
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (defendant could be retried after mistrial declared even though judge did not explicitly find manifest necessity when record provided
sufficient justification for the ruling); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (defendant
could be retried after first trial brought under defective indictment ended in mistrial over his
objection because the mistrial furthered legitimate state policy). Trial judges are given broad
discretion in applying the manifest necessity standard and only rarely is retrial barred. See
Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961) (retrial permitted after mistrial declared by judge
sua sponte even though no reason for the mistrial appeared in the record). But see United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (retrial barred where judge abused his discretion in declaring mistrial where there was no manifest necessity; other options existed). See generally Comment, Double Jeopardy:An Iizusog Remedy for GovernmentalOverreaching at Trial, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
759, 761-63 (1980).
71 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978)(where defendant himself seeks to have his
trial terminated without any submission to factfinder of his guilt, appeal by government and
subsequent retrial is not barred); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977)(retrial after dismissal of defective indictment at defendant's request not barred by double jeopardy); Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)(defendant who requested separate trials on greater and
lesser included offenses could not later claim double jeopardy protection against second trial);
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1975) (retrial not barred where mistrial was granted at
defendant's request even if necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial error).
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has recognized a narrow exception to this rule, 72 however, which applies
after a mistrial is granted at the defendant's request. The exception bars
retrial in cases where prosecutorial or judicial misconduct is aimed at
provoking the defendant into requesting a mistrial. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion is an attempt to clarify and explain the exception.
Justice Rehnquist first noted that one of.the principal rights embodied in the double jeopardy clause is the defendant's right to have his
trial completed before the first jury empanelled to try him. 73 In most
cases where the defendant has moved for a mistrial, he is deemed to
have waived this right. The Court recognized, however, that if prosecutors could "goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial," the defend74
ant's right would be a hollow shell.

Despite this recognition of the government's ability to subvert defendants' double jeopardy rights, the Court refused to broaden the test
from one of intent to provoke a mistrial motion to a more generalized
standard of "bad faith conduct" or "harassment" on the part of a judge
or prosecutor. 75 A previous Supreme Court decision, United States v. DiniZ,76 had created an ambiguity as to what the standard should be. The
72 102 S. Ct. at 2088; United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980); United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485; United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. at 468 n.3.
73 102 S. Ct. at 2087. The competing interest is society's interest in fair trials ending in
just judgments. Id. at 2093 (Stevens, J., concurring); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949).
74 102 S. Ct. at 2088 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611).
75 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485; Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736
(1963).
76 In Dinitz, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause "bars retrials where 'bad-faith
conduct by judge or prosecutor,' threatens the '[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution of a more favorable opportunity to convict' the defendant." 424 U.S. at 611 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at
485, and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. at 736). The Oregon Court of Appeals relied on
these cases in its decision. 49 Or. App. at 417-18, 619 P.2d at 949. Based on the language in
Diznilz, some courts concluded that prosecutorial or judicial overreaching would bar retrial.
The circuit courts of appeal were split on the proper test to be applied in these cases. While
several of the circuits had limited Dinitz to circumstances where the prosecutor deliberately
attempted to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
broadened the test. The Fifth Circuit indicated in various contexts that gross negligence or
prosecutorial overreaching, as well as intent to provoke a mistrial motion, could bar reprosecution on double jeopardy grounds. See United States v. Garza, 603 F.2d 578, 580 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973). See generally
Comment, supra note 68 at 767-70.
The Supreme Court in Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977), probably added to the
confusion. Lee involved a defendant who was tried and convicted on what was ultimately
ruled to be a defective indictment. The trial court dismissed the indictment, and Lee argued
that the double jeopardy clause prevented his reprosecution. The Court repeated the language ofJoin and Dinitz regarding bad faith conduct and harassment, and did not limit
double jeopardy protection to prosecutorial misconduct designed to provoke a defense mis-
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Kennedy opinion makes it very clear that the double jeopardy defense
will protect a defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial only if a
court finds that the misconduct giving rise to the motion was intended
to provoke the mistrial motion.
Justice Rehnquist stated that the difficulty in applying more general standards permitting a broader exception is that they offer no manageable standards for their application. 7 7 He correctly pointed out that,
given the complexity of the rules of evidence, it would be a rare trial
where some error in the offer of evidence did not occur. Most errors can
be cured simply by a court's refusal to admit the evidence or by an
admonition to the prosecutor to halt a particular line of questioning.
More serious infractions, however, may warrant a mistrial at the defendant's request. 78 Thus, where mere error occurs at trial, retrial will always be allowed. 79 Retrial is barred not in cases of error, but only in
those cases where the government intentionally provokes a defense mistrial motion. °
Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice Stevens for urging upon the
Court a more general test of overreaching or harassment for judging
prosecutorial error which he claimed would require dismissal of indictments without supplying any guidelines for courts to assess the error. 8'
Justice Rehnquist and Stevens recognized the same three categories:
simple error, a broad intermediate category, and misconduct intended
to provoke a mistrial. 82 However, the Justices disagreed on what rule to
apply in cases where prosecutorial error or misconduct is serious but
does not rise to the level of intentional provocation.
Justice Stevens recognized that much harm can be done to the defendant's rights even where prosecutorial misconduct falls far short of
the standard of intentional provocation; a broad middle ground therefore would be preferable for deciding cases which do not clearly fall into
either extreme category. 83 He pointed out that cases which call for a
trial request. The Court held that the errors at Lee's trial were not "the product of the kind
of overreaching outlined in Dinitz," thus implying that "overreaching" at least in some circumstances, might bar retrial. Id. at 34.
77 102 S. Ct. at 2089.
78 Id.
79 The rule is in harmony with the general rule that, where conviction is reversed for
procedural error, retrial is permitted.
80 102 S. Ct. at 2089.
81 Id.
82 Justice Stevens also agreed with Justice Rehnquist on both the competing interests to
be recognized in double jeopardy cases and the rule to be applied in cases at either extreme.
At one end of the spectrum is simple error, in which case retrial is permitted. At the other
extreme is clear prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial motion in which case retrial is
barred.
83 102 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
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balancing of competing interests can seldom be decided according to
one established rule.

4

Justice Rehnquist emphasized the relative ease in applying a test of
prosecutorial or judicial intent. The test "merely calls for the court to
make a finding of a fact. Inferring the existence or non-existence of intent from objective facts and circumstances is a familiar process in our
criminal justice system." 85 Justice Stevens heavily criticized this aspect
of the majority opinion. As a practical matter, Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t is almost inconceivable that a defendant could prove that
the prosecutor's deliberate misconduct was motivated by an intent to
provoke a mistrial8 6 instead of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant. '87 He also criticized the majority for limiting the double jeopardy
clause to such a narrow class of cases when the exception to the rule that
the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to retrial is directed at a wider
range of cases than just the extreme case in which the prosecutor intentionally provokes the mistrial. 88 The exception should also apply, Justice Stevens argued, to cases in which "[a] prosecutor may be interested
in putting the defendant through the embarassment, expense and ordeal
of criminal proceedings, even if he cannot obtain a conviction," and
commits repeated prejudicial error while being "indifferent between a
mistrial . . . and an unsustainable conviction.
...89 Or the prosecutor may seek "to inject enough unfair prejudice into the trial to ensure a
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2089.
86 In 1967, a Pennsylvania court held that a mistrial intentionally caused by the prosecu-

tor bars retrial. Commonwealth v. Warfield, 424 Pa. 555, 227 A.2d 177 (1967). This was a
rare case, however, where prosecutors and defense counsel agreed beforehand in front of the
judge that the prosecutor would commit prejudicial error and the defense would then move
for a mistrial. Thus, the prosecutor's intent was clearly established.
87 102 S. Ct. at 2096. See also Green v. United States, 451 U.S. 929 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari). Justice Marshall pointed out that:
Regardless of whether the Government's misbehavior was designed specifically to provoke a mistrial or was simply intended to reduce the chances of acquittal, the net effect
on the defendant is the same; he is faced with the burdens and risks of a second trial
solely because the Government has deliberately undermined the integrity of the first
proceeding.
Id. at 931. Justice Marshall questioned:
the assumption that the Goverment in such cases tailors its misconduct to achieve one
improper result as opposed to another. It is far more likely that in cases such as this,
where the prosecution is concerned that the trial may result in an acquittal, that the
Government engages in misconduct with the general purpose of prejudicing the defendant. In this case, for example, the Government stood to benefit from [the] misconduct,
regardless of whether it resulted in a guilty verdict or a mistrial. Moreover, even if such
subtle differences in motivation do exist, I suspect that a defendant seeking to prevent a
retrial will seldom be able to prove the Government's actual motivation.
Id.
88 102 S. Ct. at 2096.
89 Id. Seea/so Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971),af'd, 467 F.2d 113 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
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conviction, but not so much as to risk reversal of that conviction." 9
This kind of overreaching would not be covered by a standard that examines the prosecutor's intent, according to Justice Stevens, because the
prosecutor's intent would be to obtain a conviction, not to provoke a
mistrial.
Thus, Justice Stevens recognized that there is a need to extend
double jeopardy protection .to a broader class of cases where the prosecutor has acted unfairly. The broader standards of bad faith conduct, harassment of the accused, and prosecutorial overreaching 9 serve as checks
on prosecutors who might otherwise be inclined to engage in prejudicial
misconduct and who know that a defendant's burden of proof will be
nearly impossible to meet.
Justice Rehnquist cautioned that the adoption of a broad and
amorphous test such as the "overreaching" standard employed by the
Oregon Court of Appeals would not help defendants and might even
work to their detriment. A trial judge could be more reluctant to grant
a defendant's motion for mistrial because the defendant's motion would
"all but inevitably bring with it an attempt to bar a second trial on
grounds of double jeopardy ... .
The rigid rule laid down by the Court in Kennedy, however, may
have as much potential for causing hardship to criminal defendants as
the broader tests which Justice Rehnquist felt might work to their detriment. Instead of the presiding judge affecting the rights of the accused,
prosecutors will be able to engage in unchecked prejudicial misconduct,
risking only a mistrial. Severely prejudicial misconduct may force a
mistrial, or the defendant may be convicted and have to appeal, then
face another trial. Conceivably, trials could be repeated many times;
each time the prosecutor could commit an error or engage in misconduct which does not demonstrate the kind of intent necessary for a court
to find that the prosecutor has deliberately set out to provoke a defendant's mistrial motion. As Justice Rehnquist himself wrote so succinctly, "[p]rosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or
overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to
'93
subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."
90 102 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
91 The "overreaching" standard originated in Justice Harlan's opinion in United States v.

Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 n.12 (1971). Although he never expressly defined the term, he characterized the standard in terms of 'judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an
acquittal."
92 102 S. Ct. at 2090.
93 Id. at 2089.
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CONCLUSION

Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Kennedy as a restatement
and clarification of previous court opinions. 94 The strictness of the standard laid down is an obvious limitation on the flexibility of courts to use
the double jeopardy clause to shield defendants from serious
prosecutorial misconduct. Courts must now find prosecutorial intent to
provoke a mistrial rather than mere prosecutorial intent to harass the
defendant. By holding that a defendant must prove that the government
intended to cause a mistrial, the Court has further limited the use of the
double jeopardy clause for protecting the rights of the accused.
DEBORAH L. SCHMITT

94 On two prior occasions, Justice Rehnquist used an intent standard similar to that announced in Kennedy in dismissing double jeopardy claims. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S.
82 (1978) (government appeal of dismissal of two counts of indictment for prejudicial pre-trial
delay not barred); Divans v. California, 434 U.S. 1303 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1977) (denying stay of second state criminal trial).

